Secretarium

• The liquidators' agent marks the acquisition opportunity as sold without naming a buyer or the assets that transferred, so who now controls the Klave source code and the Secretarium and Klave trade marks is not in the public record.
• Klave required Intel SGX compatible hardware, so anyone reviving the platform inherits a dependency on one processor vendor's enclave feature.
• No source identifies an organisation as a buyer of Klave, so a reader cannot tell which deployments were production systems and which were experiments.
• The company's own domain now serves nothing but a redirect to its deployment host, so the descriptive record could disappear without notice.
• Companies House shows the accounts and the confirmation statement overdue, so the financial picture behind the liquidation is not yet public.

Secretarium sold against a specific gap in cryptography. Its own compliance page states that traditional encryption methods secure data in transit or at rest and fall short for data in use, and Klave answered that by running applications inside hardware trusted execution environments so the data stayed encrypted while the processor worked on it.

The buyers it addressed were regulated. Thales records Secretarium's business vertical as financial services, the Bank of England named it among the vendors it worked with on offline digital-pound payments, and Klave was listed for UK public-sector buyers on the G-Cloud 14 catalogue at a published price.

The cited record does not size the pain. It carries institutional interest in confidential computing and no measure of what exposure of data in use costs a bank, an insurer or a government department, so a buyer weighing Klave against doing nothing had no published figure to argue from. [s8, s20, s13, s12]

Klave ran each customer application inside its own secure enclave. The technology page states that every application on the platform is cryptographically measured and offers remote attestation to prove the computing environment is untampered, and the G-Cloud entry required Intel SGX compatible hardware on premises and in the cloud.

Underneath the applications sat a ledger. Secretarium describes a Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Raft consensus algorithm running inside the enclaves, a logchain rather than blocks, and WebAssembly smart contracts, and it presents that combination as the basis for verifying what ran without trusting the operator.

Klave for AI carried the same design into model work. The Klave for AI page claimed end-to-end encryption from retrieval-augmented generation through inference, support for LLaMa.cpp, BitNet and models on HuggingFace, and the Model Context Protocol running inside secure hardware so agent tool calls left a tamper-proof audit trail.

The technical record is thinner than the marketing record. No cited source is a third-party evaluation of Klave, the Bank of England assessed several suppliers' offline payment solutions together without attributing its published findings to any one of them, and the documentation host no longer answers. [s5, s12, s7, s19, s3, s13, s22]

Secretarium argued its case against two positions rather than against a named rival. The technology page contrasts hardware-based confidential computing with virtualisation-based methods that trust hypervisors and operating-system stacks, and it says the remote attestation workflow is verifier-agnostic, so a customer is not tied to Secretarium's own verifier.

The layer it sold sat above enclaves built by a chip vendor. Intel supplied the enclaves, and the platform generated and managed its keys inside them, which left the tooling, the consensus layer and the attestation workflow as the part a buyer was choosing Secretarium for.

The reviewed sources name no competing product, so this record cannot place Klave against a named alternative. What it does name is the other suppliers whose offline payment solutions the Bank of England assessed alongside Secretarium's: Thales, IDEMIA Secure Transactions, Quali-Sign and Consult Hyperion. [s5, s7, s13]

No source identifies an organisation as a buyer of Klave, so the public record offers a prospective buyer no reference case to look up. The joint liquidators' agent describes close work with enterprise and institutional partners across financial services, AI, national infrastructure and regulated industries without naming one. The homepage's own text names Thales, Intel, Capgemini, Publicis Sapient, SocGen, Swisscom and Nvidia under a heading reading "trusted by leading partners", and describes applications under its adopters heading, among them SoftMetal, an auction-exchange platform for multi-element metals.

What the record does document is programme participation. The Bank of England named Secretarium among the vendors it worked with on offline digital-pound payments, Google selected it for the 2025 Growth Academy cohort for AI and cybersecurity startups, Thales listed it as a technology-alliance partner whose integration keeps secrets in hardware security modules, and IntellectEU published a joint proof of concept for digital-asset signing in March 2025.

The purchasing route it built is closed. Klave was listed on the G-Cloud 14 framework at £5,000 a licence with a free trial, and the Digital Marketplace records that Secretarium stopped offering the service on 3 December 2025. [s16, s13, s18, s20, s19, s12]

The record names two founders in charge. PwC records Bertrand Foing as co-founder and chief executive and Cédric Wahl as co-founder and chief technology officer, and Secretarium's events page shows both speaking in 2025, Foing on confidential computing in financial services and Wahl on building digital commodity markets.

The engineering credentials are documented and the founding record is short. The GitHub organisation describes a team of experts in Intel SGX development and privacy research, and the liquidators' agent records seven years of research and development behind the platform. No cited source records a previous company either founder built or sold, a sustained publication record, or recognition of the individuals by a third party, so a buyer had no earlier delivery to judge them by. [s17, s6, s9, s16]

The compliance record on the G-Cloud entry contradicts itself. The listing's certifications block answers yes to ISO/IEC 27001, names Sancert as the accreditor and 07/08/2024 as the accreditation date, and answers yes to Cyber Essentials. A free-text governance field on the same page describes Secretarium as still implementing an information security management system to obtain ISO 27001. The same block answers no to ISO 28000, CSA STAR and PCI certification. A buyer could not settle the ISO 27001 question from the listing alone.

No certification portal backs the compliance claims. No trust or security subdomain resolves for secretarium.com, a control subdomain does not resolve either, and the site publishes no certification or assurance page of its own.

Operational commitments were written down. The same G-Cloud entry describes user applications and ledgers backed up automatically across a cluster of machines in different data centres, TLS at version 1.2 or above between buyer and supplier networks, and an end-of-contract extraction that keeps customer data in its original structure. [s12, s21]

Add analyzed competitors to compare them side by side with Secretarium.

Secretarium aimed at organisations that must process data they are not allowed to expose. Its technology page names financial institutions and healthcare providers as the buyers that need strict privacy compliance, and its DORA page targets financial entities and their ICT suppliers under an EU regulation whose requirements apply from January 2025.

The evidenced segment is narrower than the stated one. What the reviewed sources document is central banking and financial-market infrastructure: the Bank of England named Secretarium among the vendors it worked with on offline digital-pound payments, Thales records its business vertical as financial services, and its own award list runs through the Monetary Authority of Singapore's CBDC challenge, a BIS and G20 TechSprint and a Swift hackathon.

What that segment did not produce is in the record too. The independently documented engagements are experiments, challenges and proofs of concept in those sources' own words, and the company's own pages add an unnamed commodity-trading deployment. No source names a production customer or a repeat purchase.

Klave for AI applied the enclave design to model work. The Klave for AI page claimed end-to-end encryption from retrieval-augmented generation through inference, support for LLaMa.cpp, BitNet and models on HuggingFace, and the Model Context Protocol running inside secure hardware so agent tool calls left a tamper-proof audit trail.

The private retrieval design is the specific part. Secretarium describes a private retrieval store built from three pieces, a vector database of embeddings, an encrypted governance database holding access rights, and an encrypted mapping database linking embeddings back to the original content, with agents able to draw on several such stores at once.

The AI line is the least evidenced. No cited source records a deployment of Klave for AI, Google's cohort entry describes the company in one general sentence about running applications on sensitive data, and the quotations the product page carries from Apple, JPMorgan Chase and the National Security Agency are about confidential computing rather than about this product.

One route to a buyer was a public procurement catalogue. Klave sat on the G-Cloud 14 catalogue for UK public-sector buyers at £5,000 a licence with a free trial and an educational discount, and support ran through email and Discord with a 48-hour response time.

The enterprise motion ran through partners. Thales listed Secretarium as a technology-alliance partner whose integration keeps secrets in hardware security modules, IntellectEU published a joint proof of concept in March 2025 combining its Catalyst Blockchain Manager with Klave for key custody and transaction signing, and the liquidators' agent records a partnership with OVHcloud's Open Trusted Cloud.

Neither motion produced a named buyer. The liquidators' agent describes close work with enterprise and institutional partners across financial services, AI, national infrastructure and regulated industries without naming any of them, and the Digital Marketplace records that Secretarium stopped offering Klave on 3 December 2025.

The published price was a flat licence. The G-Cloud entry lists Klave at £5,000 a licence, offers a discount to educational organisations, and gives a free trial carrying every pay-as-you-go feature except deployment outside a development cluster.

Support was priced separately. Basic support over email and Discord was free of charge, while advanced support was charged on a time and materials basis according to what the customer needed.

What Klave earned is not in the record. No cited source gives a contract value, a licence count or revenue of any kind, so the published licence price cannot be read as a price anyone paid.

Klave was built to remove operations work from the customer. The platform pages claimed a NoOps service on which customers focused on business logic rather than infrastructure, applications deployed often within seconds through the developer's own workflow, and no cryptography or low-level programming knowledge was needed.

The operational commitments were written down. The G-Cloud entry describes user applications and ledgers backed up automatically across a cluster of machines in different data centres, and TLS at version 1.2 or above between buyer and supplier networks.

Two hard constraints sat under the promise. Deployment required Intel SGX compatible hardware and a compatible Linux distribution whether on premises or in the cloud, and free support ran through email and Discord with a 48-hour response time, with call support charged on a time and materials basis. Both narrowed where Klave could run and how quickly a customer could get help.

The compliance record on the G-Cloud entry contradicts itself. The listing's certifications block answers yes to ISO/IEC 27001, names Sancert as the accreditor and 07/08/2024 as the accreditation date, and answers yes to Cyber Essentials. A free-text governance field on the same page describes Secretarium as still implementing an information security management system to obtain ISO 27001. The same block answers no to ISO 28000, CSA STAR and PCI certification. A buyer could not settle the ISO 27001 question from the listing alone.

Secretarium made its trust case in cryptography. Its argument was that anyone can cryptographically attest the guarantees of a service it hosts, and that its remote attestation workflow is verifier-agnostic, so a customer can validate an attestation independently or through a third-party verifier instead of relying on the company.

No certification portal backs that up. No trust or security subdomain resolves for secretarium.com, a control subdomain does not resolve either, and the site publishes no certification or assurance page of its own.

Klave was sold as a platform other people build on. Customers wrote business logic as WebAssembly smart contracts, drew on a template library covering key management, tokenisation and custody, and connected applications natively to web and blockchain systems.

The ecosystem around it was partner-shaped and thin. Thales supplied hardware security modules, IntellectEU built a joint proof of concept, OVHcloud's Open Trusted Cloud is recorded as a partner, and the public GitHub organisation carries 54 repositories of developer tooling, demonstrations and templates, while the liquidators' agent lists the platform core as a separate asset.

Everything above rested on one enclave technology. The G-Cloud entry required Intel SGX compatible processors, and the ledger design uses Intel SGX self-generated and managed keys, so the ecosystem inherited whatever happens to that hardware feature.

The record names two founders in charge. PwC records Bertrand Foing as co-founder and chief executive and Cédric Wahl as co-founder and chief technology officer, and both were still speaking publicly in 2025, Foing at the BIS Innovation Summit that September and Wahl at a London summit that February.

The engineering was specialist and long-running. The GitHub organisation describes experts in Intel SGX development and privacy research, the liquidators' agent records seven years of research and development and about £9m of investment behind the platform, and Secretarium dates its work on secure-enclave distributed ledgers to 2018.

The corporate record closes that story. Companies House shows the company incorporated on 1 October 2016 as Cryptweb Ltd, renamed in December 2018, and placed into creditors voluntary liquidation on 27 November 2025 with two joint liquidators appointed from Interpath.