All analysis was generated autonomously, without human review. Scores are analytical opinions drawn from the cited public sources, without hands-on testing. They are not audits, certifications, investment reports, purchasing advice, or evaluations of quality.
This analysis draws mostly on the vendor's own published materials, with limited outside corroboration.
A rival vendor's roundup groups GlobalSign among the Big Three public certificate authorities (s10), and its hardest asset to match is root certificates its support pages place in every popular machine, device, application and platform (s4). A funded rival can rebuild the certificate-management software. The cited pages tie trusted roots to root-program requirements (s5), a position code alone does not recreate. Its soft spot is the console layer, where larger players are consolidating and GlobalSign holds no structural lock. The CA/Browser Forum cut maximum TLS validity to 200 days in March 2026 and to 47 days by 2029. As certificates expire faster, buyers need more of the renewal automation GlobalSign sells, while each renewal is a fresh chance to move that work to a rival.
| Description | GlobalSign, a subsidiary of Japan's GMO Internet Group, is a publicly trusted certificate authority whose certificates, managed PKI, IoT device identity, and document signing secure connections for enterprises worldwide. | [f1] |
|---|---|---|
| Founded | 1996 | [f2] |
| HQ | Offices across the Americas, Europe, and Asia, under Tokyo-based parent GMO GlobalSign Holdings | [f1] |
| Product | What it does |
|---|---|
| SSL/TLS Certificates | Publicly trusted DV, OV, and EV TLS certificates issued from GlobalSign roots present in major browser and device trust stores. |
| Managed PKI (Atlas) | Cloud PKIaaS and certificate lifecycle management on the Atlas Digital Identity Platform, automating issuance, renewal, and revocation at scale. |
| IoT Edge Enroll | Scalable IoT identity platform that provisions and manages device certificates across the manufacture, deploy, manage, and sunset lifecycle. |
| Digital Signing Service | Document signing and seals meeting eIDAS and PSD2 compliance, including the GlobalSign Cygnature bulk-signing solution. |
Cyber Defense Matrix
| Identify | Protect | Detect | Respond | Recover | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Devices Workstations, servers, phones, tablets, storage, network devices, IoT infrastructure, and similar hardware. | |||||
| Applications Software, interactions, and application flows on the devices. | |||||
| Networks Connections and traffic flowing among devices and apps, plus communication paths. | |||||
| Data Content at rest, in transit, or in use across devices, apps, and networks. | |||||
| Users The people using the devices, apps, networks, and data. |
GlobalSign issues publicly trusted certificates, runs managed PKI and certificate lifecycle automation, signs code and documents, and provisions IoT device and machine identities, defending conventional data, application, network, and device trust, which maps it to the Cyber Defense Matrix. [f3]
How well the company can compete in its security market, scored across eight dimensions against public evidence.
| Dimension | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Problem Clarity How precisely the company defines its problem, with evidence the problem exists at the scale claimed. | 4/5 | The pain is named precisely and corroborated by a non-vendor regime: the CA/Browser Forum cut maximum TLS validity to 200 days in March 2026 and browser root programs are tightening requirements, so enterprise PKI teams face a discovery-and-automation problem at growing scale that manual tracking cannot meet. [s12, s5, s6] |
| Capability Depth How specific the technical capabilities are, with evidence beyond marketing claims such as docs and third-party validation. | 4/5 | GlobalSign spans publicly trusted TLS issuance, the Atlas Managed PKI platform, IoT Edge Enroll device identity across the full lifecycle, and eIDAS and PSD2 document signing, a breadth its own product pages document and that a third-party comparison corroborates by naming it a high-assurance certificate issuer among the Big Three, though without the independent module-by-module validation its larger rival DigiCert carries. [s6, s7, s10] |
| Market Timing Whether the market is ready for this product, with evidence that buyers are actively seeking solutions. | 4/5 | Multiple dated buyer-side signals point to active demand: the CA/Browser Forum codified a 200-day TLS validity cap from March 2026 in its Baseline Requirements, browser root-program changes require TLS-dedicated roots, and the post-quantum migration all push enterprises toward certificate automation now. [s12, s5, s4] |
| Team Credibility Demonstrated domain expertise with public signals such as prior exits, publications, and industry recognition. | 3/5 | GlobalSign has operated as a certificate authority since 1996 and as part of GMO Internet Group since 2007, sustained domain standing, but the reviewed material surfaced no named executives with prior security exits or independent analyst recognition, so credibility comes from operating longevity rather than a verifiable leadership pedigree. [s2, s3] |
| GTM Proof Evidence of actual traction (customers, revenue signals, partnerships) beyond stated intentions. | 4/5 | GlobalSign names Fortune 100 reference customers including Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Adobe, and Johnson & Johnson and runs a global office footprint, and a third-party comparison independently names it one of the Big Three public CAs, with OV and EV certificates sold on its own product pages, multiple traction signals, though the customer references are self-displayed logos rather than analyst placements. [s9, s10, s3] |
| Funding Efficiency Whether funding matches go-to-market ambition, with signs of capital-efficient growth. | 3/5 | GlobalSign is funded through its public parent GMO GlobalSign Holdings, whose record FY2024 sales up 10 percent year over year cover the whole group rather than the certificate line alone and give no segment-level view, and its smaller scale and the absence of the visible acquisition-led expansion its larger Big Three rival shows keep the output-per-dollar evidence at an adequate rather than strong level. [s13, s10] |
| Category Clarity Whether the company creates or fits a recognizable category that buyers can quickly place in their stack. | 4/5 | A third-party comparison places GlobalSign among the Big Three public CAs with DigiCert and Sectigo, a clean established-category fit, but as one of several named providers it fits a 4 rather than the category-definer level a 5 requires. [s10, s4] |
| Incumbent Defensibility How vulnerable the core value proposition is to absorption as a feature by a platform vendor. | 4/5 | GlobalSign operates its own publicly trusted roots carried in nearly every browser, operating system, and device trust store, a structural position a well-funded copycat cannot replicate by writing software, which is why the consolidation pressure in the category targets the management layer rather than the root trust beneath it. [s4, s10] |
GlobalSign addresses the operational problem building inside enterprise certificate management. The CA/Browser Forum cut maximum TLS validity to 200 days in March 2026 and browser root programs are tightening their requirements, so the manual tracking most organizations still use cannot keep pace with renewal at scale.
The problem widens beyond web certificates into devices and machines. GlobalSign extends the same trust problem to IoT manufacturers provisioning device identities and to enterprises automating private PKI, where a missed or mismanaged certificate breaks production trust.
The buyers are enterprise security, PKI, and infrastructure teams at large regulated organizations and governments, the accounts where a missed renewal takes production down and strict procurement reviews any change to trust infrastructure. [s5, s7, s9]
GlobalSign sells a digital-trust portfolio anchored on one root authority rather than a single tool. Its own pages document publicly trusted TLS certificates, the Atlas Managed PKI platform for centralized issuance and lifecycle, IoT Edge Enroll for device identity from chip to field, and document signing that meets eIDAS and PSD2.
The platform extends into device and machine identity. Edge Enroll injects trusted identities at the OEM, contract-manufacturer, or chip level and lets devices self-register on first boot, which is the part of the portfolio aimed at connected-product makers rather than web operators.
The integration is the consolidation pitch. TLS, managed PKI, IoT identity, document signing, and S/MIME email all chain back to the same GlobalSign root authority, so a buyer can source trust across use cases from one provider rather than several. [s6, s7, s8]
GlobalSign competes as the smallest of the named Big Three public certificate authorities. A third-party comparison names it alongside DigiCert and Sectigo, and the category is under consolidation pressure: CyberArk completed its roughly 1.54 billion dollar acquisition of Venafi in 2024, and Keyfactor and Entrust compete on management and PKI.
What separates GlobalSign from the management-software field is the public-trust root it operates. A rival can build certificate lifecycle software, but a publicly trusted root carried in nearly every browser, operating system, and device is not something a competitor can write into existence, which is why the consolidation targets management tools rather than the root trust beneath them.
The same position carries a conditional risk and a scale disadvantage. Root standing is granted by browser and operating-system vendors and is being constrained by ongoing Chrome and Mozilla changes, and GlobalSign competes for the automation layer against larger players. [s4, s10, s5]
GlobalSign backs its market presence with a named blue-chip customer base. Its customer page lists Fortune 100 organizations including Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Adobe, and Johnson & Johnson rather than anonymized logos, and states that governments are among its customers.
GlobalSign runs its go-to-market motion globally through a public parent. It operates offices across the Americas, Europe, and Asia and is funded by GMO GlobalSign Holdings, a growing parent listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as ticker 3788, rather than by venture rounds aimed at a near-term exit.
The qualifier in this record is the sourcing. The customer names are self-displayed logos and the snapshot found no independent analyst leadership ranking of GlobalSign at all, so GlobalSign holds its market standing on thinner outside validation. [s9, s3, s10]
GlobalSign presents an at-scale operating company rather than a founder story. It has run as a certificate authority since 1996 and operated within GMO Internet Group since the 2007 acquisition, the sustained domain standing that matters in a field where trust compounds slowly.
The corporate backing is a publicly traded parent. GMO GlobalSign Holdings is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as ticker 3788, which gives the business public-company governance and disclosure discipline and the patience of an established parent.
The credibility limitation is the absence of named individual pedigree in the reviewed material. The snapshot did not surface executives with prior security exits or sustained research recognition, so the team case depends on the company's record of keeping its roots trusted across three decades. [s2, s3, s13]
GlobalSign sells trust infrastructure, so its own provenance is scrutinized closely. Operating publicly trusted roots requires ongoing conformance to the CA/Browser Forum and browser root-program regime that governs public certificate authorities, a standing that itself functions as a trust signal to enterprise buyers.
The root position is durable but maintained continuously. GlobalSign is adapting its roots to new browser requirements, including TLS-dedicated roots and a Chrome constraint on its multi-purpose roots, which shows the trust position is held against evolving policy rather than granted once.
The company page lists certification on five ISO standards, including ISO 27001, ISO 27017 cloud security, and ISO 27701 privacy. A full review of the underlying audit report scopes was outside this analysis's scope, so the snapshot credits the listed certifications without confirming specific report boundaries, and a later pass should document the trust collateral directly. [s4, s5, s14]
| Company | Relationship | Note | Compare |
|---|---|---|---|
| DigiCert | competes with | A Big Three public certificate authority larger than GlobalSign, with a broader DigiCert ONE platform and independent IDC and Gartner placements GlobalSign does not carry. | N/AWe captured the evidence for these companies under different evidence-model versions (v1 vs v2), so the totals were scored under different conditions and are not directly comparable. |
| Sectigo | competes with | Named alongside GlobalSign and DigiCert as one of the Big Three public certificate authorities, competing directly on public TLS issuance and CLM. | |
| Keyfactor | competes with | Machine-identity and PKI platform with CA-agnostic certificate lifecycle automation and the open-source EJBCA authority, competing on certificate management without operating GlobalSign's public-trust roots. | |
| Entrust | competes with | PKI, HSM, and identity provider that competes on managed PKI and certificate lifecycle, after selling its public TLS certificate business to Sectigo following a 2024 browser distrust. | |
| Venafi (CyberArk) | competes with | Machine-identity management pioneer acquired by CyberArk in 2024, illustrating the platform consolidation pressure on the management layer. |
Add analyzed competitors to compare them side by side with GlobalSign.
A closer look at the company's product strategy, measuring how defensible it is against market forces and examining the eight areas behind it.
press the advantage
What a rival cannot quickly reproduce is GlobalSign's publicly trusted root, and the software above it is the replicable part. A funded rival can rebuild the certificate lifecycle and managed-PKI console, and larger players are consolidating that layer. Root certificates distributed across trust stores (s4) are different: software alone does not recreate that position, which the cited pages tie to root-program requirements (s5). That root position, and the structural work a change of authorities entails, with no migration case in the record sizing it, separates GlobalSign from the certificate-management field. Its weak spot is the console layer above the root, where, as certificates expire faster, customers get more frequent occasions to re-shop it.
| Dimension | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Value Delivery Does the product sell software as the product, or judgment, trust, or accountability with software as the delivery mechanism. | 3/3 | GlobalSign sells externally recognized certificate trust, and the software is how that trust is delivered. Its Managed PKI page says customers are not charged for setup, hosting, or profiles and pay for certificates, and its support pages place its root certificates in every popular machine, device, application, and platform. The Atlas console and Edge Enroll deliver that credential rather than constitute the thing bought. |
| Switching Cost How expensive leaving is for a customer: data portability, integrations, learned workflows, network effects, regulatory data residency. | 2/3 | Leaving GlobalSign means reissuing certificates and re-pointing managed-PKI automation, migration work with no case in the record sizing it and no documented dependence beyond the reissuance itself. |
| Compliance Moat Whether certifications, liability acceptance, or audit trails block an easy replacement. | 2/3 | GlobalSign operates publicly trusted roots under the CA/Browser Forum and browser root-program requirements that govern public certificate authorities, and the Forum's baseline requirements set auditing requirements for issuing publicly trusted TLS certificates (s12) rather than the customer-facing compliance templates a 1 would reflect, while the same browser-driven root changes show the standing is conditional rather than the absolute gate a 3 would need. |
| Problem Complexity Whether the product requires ML, optimization, real-time systems, or years of specialized expertise. | 3/3 | Running publicly trusted certificate authorities at internet scale, automating certificate issuance across large certificate estates, and provisioning device identities from chip to field is security-critical cryptography and distributed-systems engineering that takes years of specialized expertise. |
| Buyer Profile Whether buyers are SMB operators, mid-market IT teams, or regulated enterprises and governments with procurement gates. | 3/3 | GlobalSign has sold the line to large regulated enterprises and governments. Its customer page says its customers include numerous Fortune 100 companies and governments, and separately names Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, and Johnson & Johnson among the organizations it serves. That buyer class clears the regulated-buyer bar a 3 reflects. |
| Layer Whether the product is an end-user application, a platform with application features, or infrastructure other applications depend on. | 3/3 | The publicly trusted roots and certificate lifecycle automation sit in the authentication and trust path other systems depend on to function (s4, s6), infrastructure rather than an end-user application, with expiry-driven outage risk the category's operating logic rather than a cited case. |
| Proprietary Data, Content, or IP Whether the product accumulates datasets, content licenses, or IP that a rival cannot recreate from scratch. | 2/3 | GlobalSign operates its own publicly trusted root hierarchies carried in browser, operating system, and device trust stores, a named asset a funded rival cannot enter merely by writing software but only by satisfying browser root-program requirements over time. |
GlobalSign targets organizations that must manage cryptographic trust at machine scale across large enterprise estates. The buyer is the security, PKI, and infrastructure leader accountable for the certificates, devices, and machine identities that keep production systems trusted, and the pain is concrete: the CA/Browser Forum cut maximum TLS validity to 200 days in March 2026 and is moving lower, so manual certificate tracking breaks down at scale.
The segment skews to large regulated organizations and governments. GlobalSign says its customers include numerous Fortune 100 companies and governments, and separately names Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, and Johnson & Johnson among the organizations it serves. That is the buyer class where a change to trust infrastructure is rarely a quick decision, though the cited pages do not document GlobalSign's own procurement or replacement cycles.
The IoT and device-identity push widens the same segment toward manufacturers. Edge Enroll injects trusted identities at the chip, OEM, or contract-manufacturer level, which extends the certificate buyer to product and engineering teams shipping connected devices.
GlobalSign spans the trust stack from public certificate authority to managed PKI to device identity and document signing. The Atlas Digital Identity Platform supports Managed PKI as a centralized service for issuance, renewal, and revocation (s6), IoT Edge Enroll provisions device certificates across the full lifecycle, and the digital signing service produces signatures and seals that meet eIDAS and PSD2.
The differentiator is operating the publicly trusted roots themselves. GlobalSign states its root certificates are present in every popular machine, device, application, and platform that uses public key infrastructure, an admission software alone does not confer, which anchors the rest of the portfolio.
The portfolio reads as breadth assembled around one trust core rather than a single dominant product. TLS, managed PKI, IoT identity, document signing, and S/MIME email are organized around GlobalSign's own certificate issuance and lifecycle operations, which is the consolidation pitch GlobalSign makes to a buyer who would otherwise assemble these from several vendors. The cited pages do not establish one shared root behind all five, and root programs in fact push the other way: GlobalSign's own notice records that publicly trusted TLS certificates must come from roots dedicated exclusively to TLS.
Go-to-market rests on a named blue-chip customer base and a global direct-and-channel motion. The customer page says its customers include numerous Fortune 100 companies and separately names organizations including Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Adobe, and Johnson & Johnson rather than anonymized logos, and GlobalSign runs offices across the Americas, Europe, and Asia.
GlobalSign sits under a public parent, GMO GlobalSign Holdings, listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as 3788 (s13), a corporate rather than venture timeline, with no line-level financials or resourcing disclosed in the cited record.
What the record qualifies is the absence of independent analyst placement in the reviewed material. The customer names are verifiable as displayed logos, and the snapshot found no third-party analyst leadership ranking of GlobalSign in the reviewed material, so the scale claims rest more on self-displayed references than outside validation.
The reviewed Managed PKI and IoT pages publish no full price card, and the Managed PKI page describes pay-as-you-go, deposit, and license purchasing options. The reviewed pages market Atlas Managed PKI, IoT Edge Enroll, and document signing by their capabilities without dollar figures, which signals a sales-led motion aimed at large, negotiated deals.
The implied unit of value is the certificate and trust estate under management. A buyer rooting public and private trust in GlobalSign and automating lifecycle across clouds and devices is priced on the scale and shape of its certificate footprint, which fits the enterprise buyer but offers an outside reader no forecastable per-unit benchmark.
The reviewed pages market the managed-PKI and IoT lines by capability rather than price, consistent with a quote-led motion aimed at negotiated enterprise deals. That fits a company that began in browser-trusted web certificates and grew into enterprise PKI sold through procurement.
GlobalSign delivers a centralized cloud platform across the public and private trust needs its enterprise buyers carry. Atlas runs Managed PKI as a high-availability service for streamlined issuance, renewal, and revocation, and Edge Enroll handles device enrollment from manufacture through end-of-life sunset.
The operational core is automated discovery and lifecycle rather than manual tracking, which is what makes a world of shortening certificate validity operable where manual processes fail at scale.
The heavier operational question is that the product becomes part of the trust path. A publicly trusted authority and the automation that issues production credentials are a dependency whose failure blocks trusted connections, so a careful security review probes availability and the integrity of the issuance pipeline before rooting trust in it.
GlobalSign sells trust, so its own provenance is scrutinized closely. Operating publicly trusted roots requires ongoing conformance to the CA/Browser Forum and browser root-program regime that governs public certificate authorities, a posture that itself functions as a trust signal to enterprise buyers and a barrier a new entrant cannot shortcut.
The root standing is durable but conditional. GlobalSign is adapting its roots to new browser requirements, including TLS-dedicated roots and a Chrome constraint on its multi-purpose roots, which shows the trust position is maintained continuously against evolving policy rather than granted once.
The company page lists certification on five ISO standards, including ISO 27001, ISO 27017 cloud security, and ISO 27701 privacy. The reviewed sources do not establish the boundaries of the underlying audit reports, so the listed certifications stand as GlobalSign states them, with the specific report scopes unconfirmed.
GlobalSign's marketing frames Atlas as a platform, and the cited pages document Managed PKI on it (s6). Managed PKI runs on the Atlas platform (s6), the marketing frames the wider portfolio around it, and the cited pages stop short of stating that IoT identity, document signing, and email security all run on Atlas, so consolidation is the pitch rather than a documented architecture.
The ecosystem reaches into manufacturing and document workflows. Edge Enroll integrates at the chip, OEM, and contract-manufacturer level, and the signing service integrates with document workflows under eIDAS and PSD2, extending the platform beyond web certificates into devices and signed records.
The ecosystem advantage is bounded by scale relative to its peers as the record frames them: a competing vendor's roundup groups GlobalSign among the Big Three and calls DigiCert the biggest high-assurance issuer (s10), so the platform breadth competes for the management and automation layer against rivals consolidating the same category.
GlobalSign presents an at-scale operating company rather than a founder narrative. It has run as a certificate authority since 1996 and operated as part of GMO Internet Group since the 2007 acquisition, the sustained domain standing that matters in a field where trust compounds slowly.
The corporate backing is a publicly traded parent. GMO GlobalSign Holdings is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as ticker 3788, which brings public-company reporting obligations at the parent level, though the cited record does not establish how that governance reaches the GlobalSign business or its investment horizon.
The credibility signal is operating longevity and a maintained root position rather than a marquee serial-exit pedigree. The reviewed material did not surface named individual executives with prior security exits, so the team case depends on the company's track record of keeping its roots trusted across three decades rather than on individual leadership profiles.
| Id | Source | Tier | Accessed |
|---|---|---|---|
| f1 | GlobalSign: global identity authority, subsidiary of GMO Internet Group | official | 2026-06-21 |
| f2 | Wikipedia: GlobalSign founded Belgium 1996, acquired by GMO 2007 | research | 2026-06-21 |
| f3 | GlobalSign: digital identities for everyone and everything | official | 2026-06-21 |
| Id | Source | Tier | Accessed |
|---|---|---|---|
| s1 | GlobalSign: the global identity authority, since 1996 “GlobalSign is the global identity authority providing security, convenience and trust through digital identities for everyone and everything.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s2 | Wikipedia: GlobalSign founded Belgium 1996, acquired by GMO 2007 “GlobalSign was founded in Belgium in 1996 and acquired in 2007 by GMO group in Japan (formerly GeoTrust Japan).” | research | 2026-06-21 |
| s3 | GlobalSign 25 years: GMO subsidiary, offices Americas, Europe, Asia “A subsidiary of Japan-based GMO GlobalSign Holdings K.K and GMO Internet Group, GMO GlobalSign has offices in the Americas, Europe and Asia.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s4 | GlobalSign Root Certificates: trust anchors in every popular browser and device “Our root certificates are some of the most trusted root certificates in the PKI ecosystem. ... Our Root Certificates can be found in every popular machine, device, application and platform that uses the trust of Public Key Infrastructure” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s5 | GlobalSign: CA/Browser Forum and browser root-program changes to TLS roots “The CA/Browser Forum has approved reducing maximum TLS certificate validity to 200 days starting March 15, 2026. ... Publicly trusted TLS certificates must be issued from roots dedicated exclusively to TLS” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s6 | GlobalSign Managed PKI on the Atlas Digital Identity Platform “Managed PKI is supported by our Digital Identity Platform Atlas, offering high availability, performance and security to support your certificate requirements ... a centralized platform for streamlined issuance, renewal, and revocation of digital certificates.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s7 | GlobalSign IoT Edge Enroll device identity lifecycle “Inject trusted identities at the OEM, EMS, or chip level, for Greenfield or pre-provisioned Brownfield devices. ... Devices self-register securely on first boot, no manual steps or key distribution required.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s8 | GlobalSign Digital Signatures and Document Signing, eIDAS and PSD2 “Our Document Signing Solutions are designed to secure documents and streamline workflows with digital signatures and seals ... Meet compliance and industry regulations such as eIDAS and PSD2” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s9 | GlobalSign customers: Fortune 100 companies and governments “GlobalSign customers span across the globe including prominent worldwide organizations such as numerous Fortune 100 companies, Governments ... Adobe Systems Inc ... Amazon.com ... Apple, Inc. ... Cisco ... Intel ... Johnson & Johnson ... Microsoft Corp” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s10 | QCecuring: DigiCert, Sectigo, GlobalSign named the Big Three public CAs “They're one of the "Big Three" public CAs (alongside Sectigo and GlobalSign) and the largest issuer of high-assurance (OV/EV) TLS certificates.” | research | 2026-06-21 |
| s11 | CyberArk completes Venafi acquisition (~$1.54B) “CyberArk acquired Venafi for approximately $1.54 billion ... Venafi, a leader in machine identity management, from Thoma Bravo.” | press | 2026-06-21 |
| s12 | CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements: TLS validity 200 days (2026), 100 days (2027), 47 days (2029) “Certificate issued on or after 2026-03-15 ... 200 days. 2027-03-15 ... 100 days. 2029-03-15 ... 47 days.” | research | 2026-06-21 |
| s13 | GMO GlobalSign Holdings (TSE 3788): public parent, FY2024 record sales “GMO GlobalSign Holdings K.K. (TSE: 3788), a key subsidiary of the GMO Internet Group ... In FY2024, the company achieved record consolidated sales of 19.16 billion yen, a 10% increase year-over-year.” | research | 2026-06-21 |
| s14 | GlobalSign: certified on five ISO standards “Certified on Five ISO Standards ... ISO 27701:2019 PIMS, ISO 27017:2015 Cloud Security, ISO 22301 BCM, ISO 14001 EMS, and ISO 27001” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| Id | Source | Tier | Accessed |
|---|---|---|---|
| s1 | GlobalSign: the global identity authority, since 1996 “GlobalSign is the global identity authority providing security, convenience and trust through digital identities for everyone and everything.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s2 | Wikipedia: GlobalSign founded Belgium 1996, acquired by GMO 2007 “GlobalSign was founded in Belgium in 1996 and acquired in 2007 by GMO group in Japan (formerly GeoTrust Japan).” | research | 2026-06-21 |
| s3 | GlobalSign 25 years: GMO subsidiary, offices Americas, Europe, Asia “A subsidiary of Japan-based GMO GlobalSign Holdings K.K and GMO Internet Group, GMO GlobalSign has offices in the Americas, Europe and Asia.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s4 | GlobalSign Root Certificates: trust anchors in every popular browser and device “Our root certificates are some of the most trusted root certificates in the PKI ecosystem. ... Our Root Certificates can be found in every popular machine, device, application and platform that uses the trust of Public Key Infrastructure” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s5 | GlobalSign: CA/Browser Forum and browser root-program changes to TLS roots “The CA/Browser Forum has approved reducing maximum TLS certificate validity to 200 days starting March 15, 2026. ... Publicly trusted TLS certificates must be issued from roots dedicated exclusively to TLS” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s6 | GlobalSign Managed PKI on the Atlas Digital Identity Platform “Managed PKI is supported by our Digital Identity Platform Atlas, offering high availability, performance and security to support your certificate requirements ... a centralized platform for streamlined issuance, renewal, and revocation of digital certificates.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s7 | GlobalSign IoT Edge Enroll device identity lifecycle “Inject trusted identities at the OEM, EMS, or chip level, for Greenfield or pre-provisioned Brownfield devices. ... Devices self-register securely on first boot, no manual steps or key distribution required.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s8 | GlobalSign Digital Signatures and Document Signing, eIDAS and PSD2 “Our Document Signing Solutions are designed to secure documents and streamline workflows with digital signatures and seals ... Meet compliance and industry regulations such as eIDAS and PSD2” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s9 | GlobalSign customers: Fortune 100 companies and governments “GlobalSign customers span across the globe including prominent worldwide organizations such as numerous Fortune 100 companies, Governments ... Adobe Systems Inc ... Amazon.com ... Apple, Inc. ... Cisco ... Intel ... Johnson & Johnson ... Microsoft Corp” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s10 | QCecuring: DigiCert, Sectigo, GlobalSign named the Big Three public CAs “They're one of the "Big Three" public CAs (alongside Sectigo and GlobalSign) and the largest issuer of high-assurance (OV/EV) TLS certificates.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s11 | CyberArk completes Venafi acquisition (~$1.54B), CyberArk's own release “CyberArk acquired Venafi for approximately $1.54 billion ... Venafi, a leader in machine identity management, from Thoma Bravo.” | official | 2026-06-21 |
| s12 | CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements: TLS validity 200 days (2026), 100 days (2027), 47 days (2029) “Certificate issued on or after 2026-03-15 ... 200 days. 2027-03-15 ... 100 days. 2029-03-15 ... 47 days.” | research | 2026-06-21 |
| s13 | GMO GlobalSign Holdings corporate site (JSON-LD structured data: tickerSymbol TYO:3788, founded 1993-12, fetched 2026-07-17) “GMO GlobalSign Holdings K.K. ... tickerSymbol ... TYO:3788” | official | 2026-07-17 |
| s14 | GlobalSign: certified on five ISO standards “Certified on Five ISO Standards ... ISO 27701:2019 PIMS, ISO 27017:2015 Cloud Security, ISO 22301 BCM, ISO 14001 EMS, and ISO 27001” | official | 2026-06-21 |
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